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WhenI tell my dog Jamestosit, mostof the timehesits. WhenI tell him
to stay, most of the time he stays. WhenI tell him to come, most of the
time he comes. WhenI say ‘good boy!’, he wagshistail. A loud ‘stopit!’
whenhebarks at inappropriate times usually makes him stop barking.
Does James understand the commands‘sit’, ‘stay’ and ‘come’? Does he
understand that ‘Good boy!’ conveys that he is being good? Does he
understand that ‘Stopit!’ conveysthat he is engaging in bad behavior?
Judging from thereliability of his behavioral responses to my commands
and wordsofpraiseorcriticism, he does indeed understand these phrases
on somelevel. But whatis the natureofthis type of understanding?
It may be thought that dogs come to understand commands,praise,
and criticism by engagingin instrumental reasoning that take the form
of a conscious or consciously accessible inference. We will probably
never know for sure whether they do. But it seems unlikely (Millikan,
2006). Certainly, prior to James’ behavioral responses to the command
‘come’, Jamesis not in the business of performinga practical inference
that has any semblance of the following piece of reasoning: “My owner
said ‘come.’ When she says ‘come’ she wants me to run to where she
is. | wantto satisfy her desires. So, it is in my best interest to run to
wheresheis’. Althoughit is difficult to know exactly how sophisticated
non-human animal minds are, it is almost certain that James did not
perform a conscious or consciously accessible inferenceof this sort.' Butif he did not, in whatsense does he understand the phrases to which he
responds?
Thereis a simple and an initially plausible answerto this question: Dogsand other sophisticated non-human animals are capable of perceiving thedistinct sound patterns of the phrases that people use with them. Thedistinct sound patterns trigger specific behavioral responses, as predicted
by the phenomenaof classical as well as operant conditioning (Rescorla,
1988; Bouton, 2016). So, understanding in dogs and other sophisticated













sounds andassociative learningvia classical or operant conditioning. No
mystery here. Or so the envisaged explanation goes. When I want James
to sit, I use the word‘sit’. Usually he respondsbysitting. But I could have
trained him differently. Instead of using the word‘sit’ I could have used
a handsignal, a whistle,a clicker ora flute and received the sameresult.
James could easily have been trained to perform the intended behavior
using any kind of audible sound device.
Compare the case of speech ‘comprehension’ in domestic dogs to
that of speech comprehension in neurotypical children who have
learned to respond to commonphrases andsentencesin English. Con-
sider this case. During dinner I notice that my daughter has finished
all her French fries but has barely touched her vegetables or chicken.
I request that she eat at least some of whatis left on her plate. There
are a numberof distinct ways in which she can satisfy my request. She
can eat everythingleft on herplate,all of her vegetables but no chicken,
all of her chicken but none of the vegetables, some but notall of her
vegetables, some butnotall of her chicken, or some of the chicken and
some of the vegetables. Although my daughter must carry out one of
the actions in orderto satisfy my request, she has a choice as to which
of the six possible actions she chooses to perform. She might even put
some conscious thought into the options before she decides what to
do. However, she likely does not need to perform any conscious or
consciously accessible inference in order for her to understand what
I wantherto do.
Despite the fact that children can grasp whatis said to them without
engaging in inference,their level of understanding seems notably differ-
ent from what wefind in domestic dogs. When I make the request ‘Please
eat at least some of whatis left on yourplate!’, my daughter mostlikely
doesn’t satisfy my request asa result of classical or operant conditioning.
That is, she does not merely respond to an experience of a particular
pattern of sounds. Butif she does not, then how is she capable of under-
standing whatI am saying?
In this chapter I will argue that we typically comprehend speech by
sensorily experiencing meanings and withouthaving to rely on conscious,
or consciously accessible, inferences.’ Call this view ‘the non-inferential
view of speech comprehension’. The meaning experienced may or may
not be a meaning the speaker intended to convey or a meaning she suc-
cessfully conveyed to someone else. Whenit is not, whatis experienced
is — with some exceptions — a case of misperception.’ Misperceiving what
a speaker intended to convey or successfully conveyed need notresult
in miscommunication, however. For example, it may appear to me that
yousaid ‘Do you have any beer?’ whenin reality you said ‘Do you have
anything to drink here?’. If my grasping the meaning of ‘Do you have any
beer?’ is a case of perception,it is a case of misperception. However, it
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miscommunication only insofaras it leads to practical misunderstanding.
If I nod and goto the fridge and bring you a beer, you maybeperfectly
happy. Nofurther questions asked.
The non-inferential view is a view about the nature of understanding.
As such, it need not be combined with any particular epistemological
theory. As I have argued in previous work (Brogaard, 2016), however,
the non-inferential view is particularly attractive when combined with
phenomenal dogmatism — the view that phenomenal seemings (or experi-
ences) can confer immediate primafacie justification on belief (Brogaard,
2016, 2017). Here I will defend the non-inferential view on epistemically
neutral grounds. That is, I will provide a number of considerations in
favor of the non-inferential view that are independent of whether or not
one accepts phenomenal dogmatism.
The plan for the chapter is as follows. In Section 2 I specify what
I meanbythe term ‘inference’ and lookat the types ofvalid or otherwise
legitimate inferences speakers typically make. In Section 3 I lookcloser at
whatit meansto say that a meaning property is presented in experience.
In Section 41 provide my main argumentsfor thinking that we frequently
perceive apparently conveyed meanings.
2. Linguistic Inferences
Before examining what exactly it means to say that a meaning prop-
erty is presented in sensory experience and defending the view that they
are sometimes thus presented, let’s have a closer look at the nature of
linguistic inference. Before saying something aboutlinguistic inference,
however, we need to be clear on whatan inferenceis.
One might suggest that an inference is a process during which a sys-
tem transitions from the informational contentofa state (e.g., a com-
putational, mental or neurological state) to the informational content
of another — in accordance with a particularrule set.* This definitionis
clearly too broad.It allows us to truly say of an unconscious machine
that it makes inferences as long as it computes information.It also classi-
fies many brain computationsthatintuitively are not inferences as infer-
ences. Here is an example of a process that is not consciously accessible
yet would countas an inference on the broad definition of ‘inference’ (for
discussion, see Brogaard, 2011a). When you reachto and grasp yourcof-
fee mug, you automatically fold yourfingers in a particular waythatfits
the handle of the mug. This folding of your fingers is also knownas‘the
hand aperture’. Your brain calculates the hand aperture it assumes will
fit the mug. But there is no way you could reproducethese calculations
ona consciouslevel. The process takes place below the level of conscious
awareness and is inaccessible to consciousness. The calculation of the
















‘Inference’, as the phrase ought to be used, refers to processes per-
formed byentities that at least sometimes are (phenomenally) conscious
in the sense of having (phenomenally) conscious mental states (Valaris,
2017). If a transitioning from the content of one mentalstate or disposi-
tional structure to the content of another is inaccessible to consciousness,
then the process takes place only on a subpersonal level and hence does
not countas an inference.
Following Daniel Dennett (1969:93), the distinction between the per-
sonal level and subpersonallevel is groundedin distinct kinds of expla-
nations one can provide for why people behave the way they do. The
distinction is that between ‘the explanatory level of people and their sen-
sations andactivities and the subpersonallevel of brains and events in the
nervous system’ (196, p. 93). Personal level explanations are distinctive
kinds of explanation for persons:
When we’ve said that a person’s in pain, that she knows which bit
of her hurts and that this is what’s made herreact in a certain way,
we’ve said all that there is to say within the scope of the personal
vocabulary. . . . If we look for alternative modes of explanation, we
must abandonthe explanatory level of people and their sensations
andactivities and turn to the sub-personal level of brains and events
in the nervous system.
(1969, p. 93)
Although personal-level explanations mayrefer to arational mental states
like pain, they can also refer to mental states, such as ‘needs, desires,
intentions, and beliefs’, that can be evaluated in terms of rationality,
(Dennett, 1969, p. 164). Subpersonal-level explanations, on the other
hand, are not concerned with normative properties such as that of being
rational; they merely make reference to causal relations and mechanisms.
Inferenceis a type of process that contributes to making behaviorintel-
ligible in terms of normsofrationality. For example, I might make the
following inference. ‘Otavio turned off the air conditioning in the semi-
nar room. When Otdavio turnsoff the air conditioning, he is cold. Hence,
Otavio is cold’. Since the process of transitioning from the content of a
mental state or dispositional structure that is inaccessible to conscious-
ness to the content of another (perhaps in accordance with a particu-
lar rule set) does not and cannot make behaviorintelligible in terms of
normsofrationality, these types of processes do not countas inferences.
To recap: ‘inference’, as the phrase ought to be used,refers to a pro-
cess of transitioning from the content of one personal-level state to the
content of another personal-level state (perhaps in accordance with a
particular rule-set). Because unconscious machines do not make com-
putations that transition from the content of a personal-level state to
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‘inference’ restricts inferences to those that are either explicit (i.e., the
subject is consciously aware of making them) or consciously accessible
(i.e., the subject could — under different psychological or environmental
conditionsofthe sort that can obtain in this world — have been aware of
making them). This definition leaves out‘inferences’ that are subpersonal
and therefore not consciously accessible. It also rules out that cognitive
penetration — the phenomenonaccording to which the contentof a cogni-
tive state is semantically impacting the content of a sensory experience —
is a case of inference, evenif it could be likened to inference (Brogaard
and Chomanski, 2015). This is because cognitive penetration, as com-
monly conceived, is not a process accessible to consciousness.It occurs at
a subpersonallevel. Although it has been argued that cognitive penetra-
tion can result in a downgrade of the justificatory status of experiences,
the subject would notordinarily be able to tell whether an experience has
been cognitively penetrated (Siegel, 2017; Chudnoff, 2018).
Turning now to linguistic inference, a linguistic inference made by
a listener or addressee, then, is a conscious or unconscious (but con-
sciously accessible) process that transitions from the content of one
mental state about what was conveyed to the content of another state
concerning what was conveyed — in accordance with a particular rule
set. Whenlinguistic inferences are valid,the rule set is derived from prin-
ciples governing inductive or deductive inferences or inferences to the
best explanation.
Paul Grice (1975) suggested that when rational agents engage in con-
versation, all participants in the conversation stand to gain if they all
adhere to a super-maxim knownas ‘the cooperative principle’ as well as
four sub-maxims:
The cooperative principle (super-maxim): Make your contribution as
is required, whenit is required, by the conversation in which you
are engaged.
Quality: Contribute only what you knowto betrue. Do notsayfalse
things. Do not say things for which you lack evidence.
Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required. Do
not say more thanis required.
Relation: (Relevance): Make your contribution relevant.
Manner:(i) Avoid obscurity; (ii) avoid ambiguity;(iii) be brief; (iv) be
orderly.
Grice cites four types of cases in which a conversationalistfails to adhere
to the maxims:
(1) Violation: A speaker may violate a maxim without makingit explicit















(2) Opting out: A speaker may opt out of the conversation by explicitly
saying or signaling that she refuses to be cooperative,for instance, by
giving the speakerthesilent treatment.
(3) Flouting: A speaker may flout a maxim. The speakerstill adheres to
the cooperative principle but she is blatantly violating a maxim to
achieve a particular communicative effect.
(4) Clash: If two maxims cannotboth besatisfied, the speaker is then
forced to choose between the two, thusviolating a maxim but only
because there is no way notto doso.
Grice thought of apparently conveyed meanings as derived from infer-
ences that presume that the speaker knows the conversational maxims.
Hecalls these derived meanings ‘conversational implicatures’.
In somecases, conversational implicatures are derived on the assump-
tion that the speaker adheresby all maxims. Consider the following case.
Jill points to a group of people at a function she is attending and informs
Jack that her friend is the one with glasses. Jack looks at the group and
spots a person withoutglasses, a person with glasses, and a person with
a hat and glasses. He assumesthatJill is cooperative and hence is pro-
viding all information needed in order for him to unequivocally identify
her friend. According to the Gricean model, Jack then infers thatif Jill’s
friend had been the one with both hatandglasses, Jill would have men-
tioned thehat in addition to the glasses (see Figure 4.1). Since she didn’t
mentionthe hat, and since she is cooperative, the friend must bethe per-
son with glasses but no hat.
In other cases, implicatures are derived by an inference from a pre-
sumed violation of a maxim. Consider the following discourse fragment:
Jill: Iam upset becausethis student of mine keeps com-
plaining about the grade I gave him in mylogic
class and now his motherhas gotten involved too.
She has been calling methree times to try to get me
to changehis grade.
Jack [sarcastically]: Yeah, UM students are so independent.
The implicature here is that UM students are not very independent. Here
is how Jill mightinfer this implicature from whatJacksaid.Jill presup-
poses that Jack is obeying the cooperative principle. But Jack blatantly
violated the maxim of Quality by saying something that he believes to
be false. He has done nothing to makeJill think he accidentally violated
the maxim. So Jack must be attempting to convey a claim thatis differ-
ent from butrelated to the one that he semantically expressed. Since he
said whathebelievesis false, he must be attempting to convey that UM
students are not very independent.
EEE 
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Figure 4.1 Gricean Implicature
The speaker points to a group ofpeople at a function andstatesthat her friend is the one
with glasses. The listener looks at the group and spots one person without glasses, one
person with glasses and one person with a hat and glasses. He assumesthat the speaker
 
 is cooperative and hence is providing all relevant information for identifying her friend. 7
According to the Gricean model, he then infers that if the friend was the one with both hat 4
and glasses, the speaker would have mentioned the hat in addition to the glasses. Since she “
didn’t mention the hat, and since she is cooperative, her friend must be the person with Ee
glasses but no hat. i
:
Grice’s own description of his notion of conversational implicature 4
makes it clear that he thinks conversational implicatures are derived "
inferentially rather than at a subpersonallevel:
I am nowin position to characterize the notion of conversational
implicature. A man who,by (in, when) saying (or making asif to say)
that p has implicated that q, may be said to have conversationally
! implicated that q, PROVIDED THAT(1) heis to be presumed to
be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the cooperative
principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q
is required in order to make his saying or making asif to say p (or






(3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that
the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to
work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentionedin (2)
IS required.
(Grice, 1975, pp. 49-50)
Note that Grice here assumes that the listener is aware of, or thinks
about, whatis required in order for an utterance to satisfy the conversa-
tional maximsor the cooperative principle. This view strongly suggests
the inferential view, at least with respect to conversational implicature. In
the followingsection, I will provide a number of considerations against
an inferential view of speech comprehension.
3. Experiencing Apparently Conveyed Meanings
If the non-inferential view of speech comprehensionis correct, then we
sometimes experience apparently conveyed meanings,i.e., meanings that
appear to us to be conveyed by the speaker whois addressing us(see,
however, O’Callaghan, 2011). Consider this case: Jack informs Jill that
the rain stopped. AssumingJill has an accurate experience of the meaning
conveyed by Jack’s utterance, the meaningthe rain stoppedis presented
in Jill’s auditory experience. Because Jill believes Jack is a reliable wit-
ness, she comesto believe that the rain stopped.
Contrast this with the following case: Jill already believes it is raining.
But she looks out the window andsees a sunnysky.Jill forms the belief
that that the rain stopped on the basis of her visual experience of the
sunny sky, without everreflecting on the reliability of her visual system.
The two cases differ in how easily Jill forms the belief that the rain
stopped. Of course, Jill may not trust her senses, and this may block
the formation of belief. But it is safe to say that neurotypical individu-
als ordinarily are more likely to form belief on the basis of what they
visually experience than on the basis of what they hear others say. One
belief Jill is very likely to form onthebasis of hearing Jack utter ‘the rain
stopped’, however, is the belief that Jack said that the rain stopped.So,
if Jill auditorily perceives the meaning the rain stopped but she comes to
believe that Jack said that the rain stopped, then there is an asymmetry
between experiencing what is apparently conveyed and forming a belief
about what is apparently conveyedonthe basis of hearing the utterance.
But whatis the difference between a visual experience as of, say, a
sunnysky and an auditory experienceof, say, the meaningit’s sunny? The
most natural answer to this question is that these meanings are experi-
enced in different ways. A visual experience represents its content under
a visual manner of representation (Chalmers, 2004). A tactile experi-
ence represents its content under a tactile manner of representation(e.g.,
the roundness ofa ball is represented differently visually and tactually).  
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Likewise, it is safe to assume that an auditory experience of an appar-
ently conveyed meaning will be represented under its own manner of
representation — a manner of representation thatis different from the
visual manner, the tactile manner, etc.
Nowitis temptingto think of the perception of meanings as something
that occurs only when sentenceis expressed verbally or in ordinary writ-
ing. But I do not wantto restrict the term ‘apparently conveyed mean-
ing’ in this way. If speech comprehension can be a perceptual process,
then a personfluent in braille can probably touch meanings. Perceiving
what appears to be conveyed by a sequence of signs in American Sign
Language is a way of seeing meanings that are not necessarily written
down. There are also a plethora of linguistic and non-linguistic signals
that convey meanings, for instance: emojis — or the corresponding behav- t
ior (e.g., thumbs up) orfacial expressions (e.g., surprise), punctuation i
and intonation (e.g., ‘Mary went to the store’ versus ‘Mary wentto the
store?’), demonstrations (e.g., pointing to or gazing at something), lin-
guistic conventions(e.g., replying ‘good’ to ‘how are you?’, uttered by a
relative stranger, even if you are not good.), back channeling (e.g., reply-
ing with ‘mhm,’ ‘uhuh,’ ‘sure,’ ‘OMG,’ ‘No kidding? to indicate that you
are listening and/orarestill interested in the content of the conversation).
As these cases demonstrate, understanding what a person meansoften
relies on whatis also known as ‘mind reading’ (Carrutherset al., 1996).
Mind readingis the grasping of what a person appears to be thinking,
feeling, or intending to do.If mind reading requires actually possessing a ‘
theory and making inferences about what people think, feel and intend, q
then the non-inferential view may be false. However, even advocates of 3
the so-called ‘theory theory’, which takes us to rely on folk psychology 4
when reading other people’s minds, denies that mind-readingis typically ‘
inferential (Gopnik, 2003, 2012). In any event, the purposes of the rest :
of the chapter, I will assume that an inferential view of mind-readingis .
incorrect. 4
c A further remark of clarification about the experience of meanings 0
I is in order here. There is a vast body of literature discussing how pre- :
] suppositions in conversational contexts can influence meaning (see e.g., '
Stalnaker, 1973). For instance,if it is presupposed in the conversational
context that bank robbers are morelikely than police officers to wear
masks, then an utterance of the discourse fragment in (1) means some-
thing entirely different from what it means in conversational contexts
wherepolice officers are morelikely than bank robbers to wear masks




(1) Thepolice officer caught the bank robber. He was wearing a mask.
It may be thought that the context dependence of conveyed meanings




| so (Brogaard, 2016b). The presupposedfact (or alleged fact) that bank
robbers wear masksis information ‘stored’ in what is known as ‘seman- |
tic memory’ (memory of facts and apparentfacts, such as the fact that
Obamawasthe 44th President of the United States).
If semantic memory is distributed across the neocortex, as some
argue (Price, Bonner, and Grossman, 2015), then semantic memory
may influence perceptual processing via top-downinfluences. There is
a long-standing debate about whether top-down influences on sensory
perception constitute cognitive penetration (Pylyshyn, 1999; Firestone
and Scholl, 2016). The outcome of this debate does not matter for our
purposeshere. Evenif the distributed semantic memory modelis correct,
(implicitly) retrieved (reassembled) semantic memory maystill be able
 
 
"i to influence the experience of apparently conveyed meaning. Such top- |
im downinfluences, however, would not be inferences for the same reason
i" that cognitive penetrationis not an inference. |
Dt Anotherpossibility is that semantic memory makes an imprint on the
hes mechanismsof the language center via a phenomenon knownas ‘per-
( ceptual learning’ (Brogaard, 2016b). Perceptual learning, unlike other |
f formsof learning, can be defined as ‘experience-induced changes in the
me way perceivers pick up information’ (Kellman and Garrigan, 2009)or as
c extracting perceptual information that was previously unused (Gibson
ne" and Gibson, 1955). In perceptual learning, semantic information indi-
rectly influences the content of experiences butit does so by altering the
i mechanisms for computing experiences. In perceptuallearning, our sen-
i" sory system is transformed in a waythat affects how things appearto us.
If speech comprehensionis a result of top-down influences on percep-
i tion or a kind of perceptual learning where semantic memory alters the
| 4 neural processing in the language center, then the fact that speech com-
i prehension depends heavily on context is perfectly consistent with the
t. non-inferential view (Brogaard, 2016b).
A question herearises: if meaning properties are presented in experi-
ence, what is the nature of these properties? Meaning properties are a
type of high-level property like artificial kind properties (e.g., being a
house, being a table or a being laptop) or emotional properties (e.g.,
being angry, being afraid or being surprised). We can take the high-level
properties that are presented in experience to be the result of an instan-
tiation of particular configurations of lower-level properties (e.g., being
watery or looking like a zebra). Call high-level properties of this kind
‘Gestalt properties’ (Brogaard, 2018).° To see whatthe natureof Gestalt
| properties is, consider the imageof the three squares in Figure 4.2.’
Thethree figuresare all perceived as possessing the Gestalt property of
looking square. But none ofthe configurations of lower-level properties
that we visually detect suffices for squareness to be present in our per-
ceptual experience. In thefirst figure the property of looking square pre-
sented in our experienceis a result of us visually detecting a solid black
 
  




Figure 4.2 The Gestalt Property of Looking Square
The three figuresall possess the property of looking square, but that property is not meta-
physically determined by any of the low-level properties ofthe figures.
mass. In the secondfigure the property of looking a square presented in
experienceis a result of us visually detecting a particular configuration of
dots. In the third figure the property of looking square presented is the
result of us visually detecting a particular configuration of line segments.
The relationship between the Gestalt property presented in experience
and the low-level properties visually detected is not one of metaphysi-
cal entailment but rather one of causation. To capture the relation of
causality, let’s exploit Mackie’s (1965) famous INUS condition. ‘[NUS’
stands for ‘an insufficient but necessary part of a condition whichisitself
unnecessary butsufficientfor the result’. For example,an electrical short-
circuit may causea fire but the short-circuit is not necessary forthefire
to occur. The fire could have been the result of arson rather than a short
circuit. Nor is the short-circuit sufficient for thefire to occur. If there is no
oxidizing agent, a short-circuit does notresult in a fire. The occurrence of
the short circuit is a necessary memberofa set of conditionsthatis itself
unnecessary but sufficientfor the fire. Other membersofthatset include
the presence of oxygen, the presence of flammable material, the absence
of flooding,etc.
Now, we can take Gestalt properties presented in experience to be
caused by sets of sensorily processed INUSconditions(e.g., configura-
tions of dots or line segments). These sets of sensorily processed configu-
rations of low-level properties (together with other INUSconditions) are
sufficient but not necessary for the Gestalt property to be presented in the
resulting sensory experience. For example, in the case of looking angry,
sensory processing of the properties that are universally characteristic of
an angry face (together with other INUSconditions), is sufficient but not
necessary for the property of being angry to bepresented in the resulting
sensory experience of anger.
The meaning properties that are presented in experience, | want to














the meaning properties presented in experience are caused by auditory
information — for instance, information taken in from the external envi-
ronment or information possessed from birth or acquired through past
perception or testimony. This pre-existing information musteither affect
sensory processing through feedback mechanisms or be the result of
altered computational mechanisms in sensory areas. Sensorily processed
information sufficient for meaning properties to be presented in experi-
ence may include information about:
e The sound properties produced by the utterance
The grammatical structure of language
° Consciously accessible or inaccessible semantic memory such as
knowledge of the semantic meaningof lexical items, pragmatic prin-
ciples, and cultural habits
e Theidentity of the speaker
e Conversation preceding the utterance
Possession of this experienced or stored information (that influences the
processing of perceptual contents) is sufficient but not necessary for par-
ticular meaning properties to be presented in experience.It is not nec-
essary because different chunks of information can result in the same
meaning property being experientially presented. For instance, exposure
to utterances of ‘Homosapiens evolved 200,000 years ago’ and ‘Human
beings evolved 200,000 years ago’ mayresult in experiences that repre-
sent different sound properties but the same meaning properties.
4. Theoretical and Empirical Considerations in Favor
of the Non-Inferential View
There are several considerations in favor of the non-inferential view of
speech comprehension: empirical as well as theoretical. Each of these
considerations merely indicates that apparently conveyed meanings can
be sensorily perceived. Together, however, they make a decentcase for the
non-inferential view.
4.1. Neuroanatomical Evidence
There is broad consensus that speech comprehension is closely tied to
processing in Wernicke’s area,sitting in the superior temporal gyrus close
to the auditory cortex, usually on theleft side of the brain (sometimes on
the right) (Bogen and Bogen, 1976).° Being located in a lowerregion of
the brain, Wernicke’s area may be considered a sensory area for language
comprehension, neuroanatomically speaking.
The hypothesis that Wernicke’s area is centra! to language comprehen-
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in speech comprehension.Asnotedearlier, one theory of semantic mem-
ory is that semantic memoryis distributed across the entire neocortex
(outer layer) of the brain. Since semantic memoryis a strong influence on
speech comprehension,the entire brain may be dedicated to the under-
standing of language.
But even on this theory, meaning processing may take place primarily
in Wernicke’s area in the temporal lobe — subsequent to feedback entry
from other brain regions. If this is indeed the case, then brain regions
often correlated with inferential processes (such as the prefrontal cor-
tex) do not play a direct role in the neural processes involved in speech
comprehension.
Oneof the things we cannotrule out on the basis of neuroanatomical
evidenceis that the brain regionsin the left temporal lobe (together with
parts of the frontal lobe) — constituting the so-called ‘language center’ —
are a neuralsubstrate for linguistic inference. It could be that linguistic
inference and other types of inference have anatomically distinct neural
correlates.
4.2. Semantic Satiation
Semantic satiation (also known as ‘semantic saturation’ and ‘semantic
adaptation’) is a phenomenonin which a repeated phrase mayloseits
meaningfor thelistener. Leon Jakobovits James, who coined the term in
his dissertation in 1962, found that repeating a phrase prior to complet-
ing a task depending on its meaning resulted in response inaccuracy or a
delayed response time (James, 1962).
Semantic satiation is a special case of stimulus satiation (whichis also
sometimes called ‘sensory adaptation’; see Block, 2014; Nes, 2016).
Stimulus satiation is different from habituation, a methodin behavioral
therapy that seeks to eliminate an emotional response to a particular
stimulus by repeating exposure to the stimulus (Glanzer, 1953). This is
a slow process thatlikely has a different neural mechanism from thefast
process of stimulussatiation.
Stimulus satiation is generally believed to be a sensory phenomenon
that involves a change in the responsiveness of the sensory system to a
repeated or constant stimulus (Glanzer, 1953). If you put your hand on
a textured pillow, you will initially feel the texture on the palm of your
hand. Butit only takes a few secondsbefore the intensity of the feeling
of the texture subsides. What happensis that the neurons that process
tactile experience provide a significant response atfirst but the neural
response of the sensory neurons then slowly diminishes.
Stimulus satiation occurs in all sensory modalities. If you live right
next to the runways of an airport, you will quickly cease to hear the
noise of the departing planes. Your visitors, on the other hand, will ini-



















smells of old garbage or cigarette smoke, your olfactory sensory system
will quickly adapt to the smell to the point where you nolongernoticeit.
The dominant hypothesis concerning the mechanism underlying stimu-
lus satiation is that the transmission from the thalamus to the sensory
cortical brain regions decreases with constant exposure, leading to a par-
tial or full closure of the gateway in the thalamusthat is responsible for
blocking irrelevant information from entering cortical areas of the brain
while letting relevant information enter. Information that doesn’t enter the
cortical areas of the brain will not generate any conscious mentalstates.
.The phenomenon Leon Jakobovits James (1962) identified when he
coined the term ‘semantic satiation’ is that we have a similar tendency
to quickly adapt to repeated phrases, quickly tuning out on what they
mean. The phenomenonof semantic satiation is another indicator that
meanings typically are sensorily comprehended rather than being the
result of an inferential process.”
4.3. Stroop Effect
Another piece of evidence for the non-inferential view comes from the
standard Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935). The Stroop effect, in its classi-
cal form, is interference found whenattention-grabbing word meanings
interfere with the naming of the ink color the words are printed in. It
typically takes longer to name the ink color when it does not match the
word meaning. We are also more prone to mistakes when the ink color
is contrary to the color depicted by the word. For example, if the word
‘red’ is printed in the ink color green, thenit is harder to name the color
than if it had been printed in red (or black).
A common explanation of this effect is that because grasping the
meaning of color wordsis far more automatized than color naming, the
meaning of the color word captures our attention and thereby distracts
us from the color naming task we were supposed to carry out(see e.g.,
Brown, Gore, and Carr, 2002).
On widely received view,this kind of attentionalbias can be explained
by the fact that the processing of meaning in sensory cortical brain
regions interferes in a feedforward fashion with the intellectual naming
task in the prefrontal cortex (Brown, Gore, and Carr, 2002). Theeffect
thus appears to indicate that the grasp of meanings occurs automatically
as a result of sensory processing, which points to the non-inferential view
of meaning comprehension.
4.4, Pop Out Effect
A further piece of evidence in favor of the non-inferential view comes
from a variation on a standard visual search paradigm. Visual search
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RED
Figure 4.3 Stroop Effect
 
The word ‘red’ is here displayed in the color black(left) and the word ‘green’is displayed
as the colorgray (right). It takes longer for subjects to name thecolor of the ink when the
wordis printed in a colorthat differs from the color designated by the word than whenit
is printed in black or the samecoloras the color designated.
occurs early on in the visual system. If a target captures our attention,
the visual detection of the target is thought to be processed early on in
the visual system.
A visual searchtest that consists of words or pseudowords canlikewise
serve as a test of whether we sensorily experience meanings. In visual
search paradigmsofthis kind, subjects are exposedto an array contain-
ing a meaningful word (the target) and meaningless variations on that
word (the distractors).
If comprehension of apparently conveyed meanings is a sensory phe-
nomenon, then we should expect the target item to capture attention
bottom-up either prior to, or simultaneously with us, becoming aware of
the target (Beck, 1966; Treisman, 1982). Whenattention is automatically
drawn to a target, strenuousefforts is unnecessary for the identification
of the target. Thus, identification of the target should be highly efficient
(i.e., fast and accurate). This is also knownas a ‘pop-out effect’. If, on the
other hand, experience of conveyed meaning requires systematic search
and systematically applied top-down attention, then the target word
should not capture attention bottom-up and the identification process
should be less efficient (slower and less accurate).
A pop-outeffect in visual search paradigmsthus suggests that a prop-
erty of the target item is sensorily presented in the early visual system. So
if a visual search for a real word (the target) among pseudowords (the
distractors) yields a pop-outeffect, then this indicates that the apparently
conveyed meaningsis presented in visual experience.
This is indeed what we find. When subjects are shownan array of a
meaningful word (the target) and meaningless variations on that word
(the distractors), the meaningful word pops out and immediately grabs
their attention (Brogaard, 2017) (Figure 4.4)."°
Whensubjects are presented with a target word that may appear to be
meaningful (‘phonetele’), a pop-out effect can be observed but the aver-
age responsetimeis radically decreased comparedto the response timein
the experimental case (Figure 4.5).
Finally, when subjects are asked to search for a pseudoword within an
















Figure 4.4 Experimental Case
The word ‘telephone’ pops out in an array of words and pseudowords. This test indicates





Figure 4.5 First Control Case





Figure 4.6 Second Control Case
When the array consists of pseudowords and no meaningful or quasi-meaningful words,
there is no pop-outeffect.
It should be noted that the experimental paradigm used here doesn’t
aim at showing directly that we perceive word meanings but rather
whether the property of being meaningful is presented in experience.
However, there is good reason to think that the ability to perceptually
determine meaningfulness normally depends on the ability to perceptu-
ally identify particular meanings. For example, in order to experience
‘telephone’ as meaningful, you would likely need to have implicit knowl-
edge of the semantic meaningof ‘telephone’. If this is so, however, then
the pop-outeffects indicate that apparently conveyed meaningsare pre-
sented in sensory experience.
This suggestion yields an empirically testable prediction: we should
expectto find that we are capable of quickly and accurately detecting a
target word that belongs to one domain,say, the domain of sea animals
(e.g., ‘Nemo’. — ‘fish’ — ‘squid’) when hidden among distractor words
(matched in length, frequency, level of abstraction, prototypicality, etc.)
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mammals (e.g., ‘Elmo’, ‘Lilo’, ‘Dora’, ‘Bart’, ‘Hulk’. — ‘bear’, ‘goat’,
‘wolf’, ‘lion’, ‘mule’ — ‘camel’, ‘zebra’, ‘tiger’, ‘horse’, ‘panda’),
One limitation of the present data, but not the research paradigm
as such, is that they do not eliminate the possibility that we would get
the same effect with any familiar string of letters, including nonsensical
words,like ‘mimsy’.
4.5. Immediacy, Automaticity, and Amodal Completion
The non-inferential view gains further support from the speed and auto-
maticity of language comprehension. Average college students can read
about 255 words per minute, which would be an impossible feat if they
were to slow down and makeinferences about what the writer intended
to convey (Christianson, Luke, and Ferreira, 2010; Ferreira, Bailey, and
Ferraro, 2002; Swets et al., 2008).
The speed and automaticity of language comprehension may be due
in part to our ability to amodally complete partially perceived meanings.
Suppose you see the following sentences in a newspaper that contains
someink stains:
(2) (a) Plus spacious 1554 sq. ft. home with large lot, family room with
fireplace and hugefjfor entertaining and enjoying the views.
(b) Local guitarist Jon Henninger announced yesterday that the
track features Henninger on guitar and Henninger’s band mate
Eric Lyday on.
(c) Charlie’s hiccups were cured throughthe use of carbon[jjjjxide.
(d) Recipe ingredients: 3 cups chopped tomatoes, 1/2 cup chopped
green bell pepper. 1 cup diced onion, 2 tablespoons chopped
fresh. 2 tablespoons fresh lime juice.
We naturally fill in ‘deck’ or ‘terrace’ in 2(a), ‘drums’ or another word
designating a musical instrument in 2(b), ‘carbon dioxide’ in 2(c) and
‘cilantro’ or some other edible ingredient in 2(d). However, errors have a
tendency to creep in in unfortunate ways. Theoriginal version of 2(a) is
shownin Figure 4.7.
Theoriginal version of 2(b) contained a typing error, which the Illinois
newspaper The Morning Sentinellater announced: ‘Dueto a typingerror,
Saturday’s story on local artist Jon Henninger mistakenly reported that
Henninger’s band mate, Eric Lyday, was on drugs. The story should have
read Lyday was on drums’,
2(c) too containsa spelling error — in this case onethatpotentially could
lead people to kill themselves instead of curing their hiccups (Figure 4.8).
The original version of the recipe in 2(d) recommended adding two
tablespoons of cement. A correction waslater issued: ‘Recipe correc-
tion: in a recipe for salsa published recently, one of the ingredients was
 
 






Spacious 1554sq.ft. home with large lot, family §
= room with fireplace, huge dick for
etitertaining & enjoying the views, 3
bedroom,2 baths, central heat & air,
views OPecity lights -& ‘Shasta.
#74916. Shirley 221-8121 or
221 “7777. $104,900. #74916 :
221-8121
    







Figure 4.7 Unfortunate Typo: Newspaper Advertisement for Real Estate
 
CORRECTION
There was an error in the Dear
Abby column that was published
on Monday. In the fifth paragraph,
the second sentence stated that
Chariie’s hiccups were cured tem-
porarily through the use of carbon
monoxide. It should have read
earbon dioxide.
 
Figure 4.8 Unfortunate Typo: Correction of Unfortunate Typo on Website
misstated due to an error. The correct ingredient is ‘two tablespoons of
cilantro’ instead of ‘two tablespoons of cement’.
While the envisaged ink stains force us to fill in words in the cases in
(2), this ‘good-enough’ approach naturally employed hereis, in fact, the
normal way we comprehend language, even when there are no occlud-
ers. We usually process only part of what we read or hear and fill in
the rest through top-down processing or amodal completion (Christian-
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The speed and automaticity of language comprehension suggests that
the processes involved in grasping conveyed meaning are not typically
personal-level processes. Hence, they are not typically the result of infer-
ences but are morelikely to be the result of processes akin to the sensory
processes involved in producing low-level sensory mentalstates.
4.6. Evidence Insensitivity
Perceptual experiences can be appropriate or inappropriate but they are
not assessable for rationality — as I am using the term in this chapter.
Granted, if the perceptual view of emotions is correct, then emotions
can besaid to be rationalorirrational only to the extent that perceptual
experiences can besaid to berationalorirrational (Brogaard and Chud-
noff, 2016),!!
But experiences are notassessable for rationality in the sense in which,
say, beliefs are. To a first approximation, a rationalbelief is a belief that
is based on goodreasonsanddoesnotstand in opposition to otherbeliefs
indicating that it may be inaccurate. For instance,if I see water pouring
down outside the window, this may give me a good reason to believe
thatit is raining. If, however, I also believe that the water is due to a new
sprinkler system that has beeninstalled on the rooftop, then that second
belief defeats my belief that it is raining. In that case, mybelief thatit is
rainingis notrational. It may be primafacie justified. But the justification
is defeated by my secondbelief.
Unlike beliefs, sensory experiences retain their prima-facie justifying
powerin light of evidence that they may be inaccurate. They are rela-
tively informationally encapsulated (Fodor, 1983). For example, in the
case of amodal completion,partially occluded figures are not perceived
as the fragments of the foregrounded figures but as hidden behind or
covered by the occluder (Figure 4.9).
In the case of vision, the process of amodal completion proceeds in
accordancewith its ownrules, viz. intra-perceptual principles, or ‘organ-
izing principles of vision’, that modulate early visual processes (Pylyshyn,
1999; Fodor, 1983; Raftopoulos, 2001).'* These intra-perceptual princi-
ples are notrationalprinciples, such as maximumlikelihood or semantic
coherence. The visual system employs them to compensate for the inher-
ent ambiguity of proximal stimuli. In Figure 4.9, for example, the prox-
imity of the regular octagonsto the occluded figure should make it more
likely that the occludedfigureis also a regular octagon. But the principles
of amodal completion work according to their own algorithms and the
occluded objectis not experienced as a regular octagon.
In recent work, SusannaSiegel (2017) has argued that perceptual expe-
rience can be epistemically downgraded. Hereis one of her examples.Jill
fears that John is angry at her. This causes her to experiencehis neutral


















Figure 4.9 Kanizsa Amodal Completion
Despite the flanking cases of octagons, the occluded figure is not seen as a regular octagon.
Source: Pylyshyn 1999
accordingto Siegel. In her view, ‘both perceptual experience and the pro-
cesses by which they arise can be rationalorirrational’ (2007, p. 15).
[am not goingto dispute this hypothesis here (for a counterargument,
see Chudnoff, this volume; Brogaard, 2019). Even ifit’s true, this does
notchallenge Pylyshyn’s (1999)claim that intra-perceptual principles are
notrationalprinciples.
The question that remainsis whether our (apparent) comprehension of
whatis said is immuneto defeaters in the same way as uncontroversial
cases of sensory experience.It appears that theyare.If I hear John ask me
whether Brian has rememberedto pick up beer for the bachelor party in
Miami, but I subsequently learn that he actually asked whether Brian had
remembered to pick up headgear for the bachelor party,I may come to
believe that I was wrong about whatI heard butthe auditory appearance
of whatI initially heard appears to be immunetothis belief.
Here is a further consideration in favor of this thesis. This is intended
to be analogousto Pylyshyn’s (1999) octagoncase. Imagine you are talk-
ing to one of your frenemies Ben. I hear you say ‘leave me alone’. I am
likely going to get the impression that you intended to convey to Ben that
he should leave you alone. Suppose, however, that several other people
in your groupstart crying out loud: ‘Please don’t leave mealonein this
god forsakenplace’. In this case, the appearanceof you havingsaid ‘leave
me alone’ may well be immunetothe possibility that you said something
that is partially occluded butsimilar to what others in your group were
saying (i.e., ‘please [. . .] leave me alone [.
.
.]).
We caneasily conjure up other examplesof the samekind. SupposeI hear
yousay to your friendsJill and Jack ‘I have not had breakfast’ andit comes
to seem to methat you are informing them that you have not had breakfast
on the day in question. But I then hear Jack exclaim: ‘Two weeks! That’s
nothing. Susan andI have not had breakfast together since she started her
new job with the MPD’.If I know I only heard a fragment of what you and
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the effect that you had not had breakfast with such-and-such a person for
two week now ought to cast doubt on whatI initially thought you said.
Butin spite of the fact that there is reason to doubt myinitial appearance
of what yousaid, that appearanceislikely to stick with me.
It seemsplausible then that apparently conveyed meanings are immune
to defeat in the same way that uncontroversial cases of visual experience
are. Since this kind of evidence insensitivity is a mark of uncontroversial
cases of visual experience, the intuition that appearances of conveyed
meaningscan also be immuneto defeat provides some supportfor think-
ing that appearances of conveyed meanings are sensory in nature.
5. Perception or Type-1 Reasoning?
In this chapter I have provided psychological and philosophical consid-
erations in favor of a non-inferential view of speech comprehension. On
this view, speech comprehension need not require personal-level infer-
ences onthe partof the hearer.
Let me end the chapter by pointing to a limitation of my argument. The
argument does not show that we can auditorily (or visually or tactually)
experience the meanings that it would seem that the author or speaker
was intending to convey. Indeed, the findings reviewed in this chapter
are compatible with the idea that a hearer (or reader or viewer) comes to
understand what the speaker (or writer) apparently intended to convey
by employing type-1 cognitive processes that make use of semantic asso-
ciations and heuristics rather than, say, probability theory or logic.
The hypothesis that cognitive processing can be dividedinto twotypes
is a postulate of dual-processing theory. According to this view, there are
two distinct ways in which we make decisions or cometo conclusionsin
daily life. Type-1 cognitive processes are fast and rely on semantic asso-
ciations and heuristics (‘rules of thumb’), whereas type-2 processes are
slow and rely on carefulreflection and inference (Tversky and Kahneman,
1973, 1983; Samuelson and Church, 2014; Roberts and West, 2015). If
indeed weoften rely on type-1 cognitive processes in order to understand
speech, thenit’s possible that grasping what a speaker appears to wantto
communicateis neither inferential nor perceptual. Butit is also possible
that at least some of the fast and automatic type-1 processes are in fact
perceptual processes.
To see this, consider judgments of personality in thin-slicing con-
ditions (i.e., conditions in which you are only exposed to a person
or a still-photo of the person for a very brief period of time). It is
widely agreed in cognitive science that these types of judgmentrely
on type-1 cognitive processing (Gigerenzer, 2007). However, there
are independent grounds for thinking that the processes that sup-
port personality judgments in these conditions are the exact same

















Likewise, it remains a possibility that if we rely on type-1 cognitive
processes in trying to understand language, these processes give rise





There may, of course, be other forms of instrumental reasoning that non-
human animals do engagein. See e.g., Camp and Shupe (2018).
Note that the non-inferential view does not imply that we never rely on
inferences when engaging in speech comprehension. Whenthe speaker inten-
tionsare not immediately clear to the addressee, the addressee may engage in
an inference before forming a belief about what the speaker might possibly
have intended to convey. The non-inferential view is thus consistent with
the occasional reliance on inference in order to derive the meaning of what
the speaker intended to convey. Consider the following case. Marianneis
a foreigner with verylittle familiarity with the meaningofslurs in English.
She does not automatically grasp their meanings. One day Marianne acci-
dentally bumps into a stranger Jennifer. This makes Jennifer angry and she
screams: ‘Bitch!’ We can imagine that Marianne, whois not very familiar
with the meaning of slurs in English, engages in the following inference on
a consciouslevel: ‘ ‘Bitch’ literally means a female fox but there is no good
reason to think the angry lady thinks I am female fox. So, she was probably
using the term in its derogatory sense, thereby conveying to me that I have
some negative traits that caused meto intentionally bump into her in order
to harm her’.
. The exceptions I have in mind include cases in which the speaker intends to
convey that p but actually conveys that q,or fails to convey anythingatall.
While visiting Spain I ask someone where I can buy some groceries. Or so
I think. WhatI actually asked, using the Spanish word‘groserias’, was where
I could buy somevulgarities. In this case, what I intended to convey is not
what native speakers hear me say. Arguably, in cases like this, what is con-
veyed is what the naive speakers think I convey. In that case, the perceptions
of the native speakers are not misperceptions.
. Note that the rules need not specify valid inferences, as a rule set could
be anyset of rules. For example, the rules that govern transitions between
neurological states might be computational in a non-standard sense (see
Piccinini and Bahar, 2013). The rules that govern transitions between men-
tal states are probably psychological laws of a kind that rules out mere
associative transitions, such as the associative transition from ‘doctor’ to
‘nurse’.
. Markos Valaris (2017) is primarily interested in reasoning, but his notion of
reasoningis closely related to the notion of‘inference’ in the narrow sense(in
the wide sense, any rule-based transition between quantities of information
can count as an inference; in the wide sense, my MacBookProis capable of
making inferences).
Gestalt properties are different from high-level properties that constitute the
essenceofa thing,for instance, being H,O, having tiger-DNAor being made
of this or that piece of clay.
. This is just an analogy. I will remain neutral on the issue of whether shape-
like properties can reasonably be considered high-level properties.
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9. Anders Nes (2016) also invokes semantic satiation andthe kinship ofthelat-
ter with sensory adaptation to suggest that utterance comprehension has an
important similarity, in this respect, to perceptual processes.
10. Pilot study, Brogaard Lab for Multisensory Research.
11. On the perceptual view, emotionsare bodily sensations producedin response
to value objects (e.g., fearfulness of tiger) (Brogaard and Chudnoff, 2016).
Bodily sensations(or bodily feelings—also knownas ‘interoception’) have not
traditionally been construed as sensory experiences. However, one might
argue that the modality that produces bodily feelings just is a sensory modal-
ity closely related to proprioception, our sense of balance (the vestibular
system) and nociception (pain and spice perception), which arguably are
sensory modalities unlike intuition and introspection (Macpherson, 2011;
Schwenkler, 2013; Briscoe, 2016).
12. Theseprinciples are akin to what Helmholtz called ‘unconscious inferences’
(Gordon, 2004), what Gregory (1968) calls ‘hypotheses’, or what Bayesians
call ‘implicit assumptions’ (Rescorla, 2015). See also Brogaard (2011b).
13. For helpful comments on previous versions of this paper, I am grateful to
an anonymousreviewer for this volume, Tim Bayne, Jake Beck, Ned Block,
Elijah Chudnoff, Jack Lyons, Fiona Macpherson, Mike Martin, Michelle
Montague, Anders Nes, Par Sundstrém, Charles Travis, Sebastian Watzl, and
audiences at Humboldt University, Kirschberg, Miami, NYU, and the 2017
Meeting of the SPP.
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